Analysis of Stable Matchings
All stable matchings in the hospital/residents problem with incomplete...
Resident-optimal matching in the hospital/residents problem with coupl...
Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (a.k.a. Boston mechanism) for two-sided...
Karlson-Holm-Breen method for comparing probit coefficients
An R package for the analysis of stable matchings.
Partitioning Linear Programme for the stable roommates problem
Predict method for fitted matching models
Random serial dictatorship mechanism
All stable matchings in the stable roommates problem with incomplete l...
Stability-Check
Matching model and selection correction for group formation
Matching model and selection correction for college admissions
Simulated data for group formation problem
Simulated data for college admissions problem
Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm with existing tenants
Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm for a two sided matching problem
Top-Trading-Cycles and Chains Algorithm
Implements structural estimators to estimate preferences and correct for the sample selection bias of observed outcomes in matching markets. This includes one-sided matching of agents into groups (Klein, 2015) <doi:10.17863/CAM.5812> as well as two-sided matching of students to schools (Klein et al., 2024) <doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.003>. The package also contains algorithms to find stable matchings in the three most common matching problems: the stable roommates problem (Irving, 1985) <doi:10.1016/0196-6774(85)90033-1>, the college admissions problem (Gale and Shapley, 1962) <doi:10.2307/2312726>, and the house allocation problem (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) <doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0>.
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